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The Destruction of Cultural Property in Timbuktu: Challenging the ICC War Crime 
Paradigm  
 
 ‘By inflicting cultural damage on present generations, the enemy seeks to orphan future generations and destroy 
their understanding of who they are and from where they come’1 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Cultural property has been destroyed, looted and trafficked throughout history, particularly 
during conflict situations.2 In many instances, the property that is destroyed belongs to, and / 
or represents, minority groups and its destruction impacts significantly on minority culture. 
ISIS, and related jihadist groups, have, in recent times, actively engaged in the deliberate 
destruction of cultural property in numerous States, including Iraq, Syria, and Mali. This has 
been described as ‘cultural cleansing’ by the Director-General of UNESCO,3 as jihadist groups 
aim to eradicate all signs of ‘other’ cultures within its newly formed State. The destruction of 
cultural property is now a strategy of war, with the objective being to eliminate cultural 
diversity and pluralism, ‘erase all sources of belonging and identity, and destroy the fabric of 
society.’4 The International Criminal Court (ICC) recently (2016) heard the case of Prosecutor 
v Al Mahdi, which focused specifically on the destruction of cultural property in Mali during a 
non-international armed conflict. The defendant was charged, under Article 8 of the ICC 
Statute, with the war crime of directing attacks against cultural property.5 Mr Al Mahdi, a 
member of the fundamentalist Islamic group, Ansar Dine, had been in charge of the Hisbah, 
the morality brigade set up in Timbuktu. One of his roles was to oversee the destruction of a 
number of religious monuments and mausoleums in the city. 6 The decision to attack these sites 
was made by the Ansar Dine leadership, as a result of their Wahabi interpretation of the Islamic 
concept of ziyara, or ‘visitation’. They believed that the visitation and veneration of burial 
monuments, which was a common practice among the local minority Sufi Muslim population, 
was idolatrous and, therefore, contravened Islam. The rationale behind Mr Al Mahdi’s and 
Ansar Dine’s actions in attacking these sites was to halt the religious practices of the local 
                                                 
1 Abtahi 2001, 2. 
2 United Nations 2016.  
3 See Bokova 2015, 289.  
4 Ibid, 290. 
5 See Frigo 2004, 367. 
6 The conflict “is a complex and multidimensional mixture of long-term fundamental grievances by diverse actors 
and groups” for which there was no one single cause. See Francis 2013, 2. 
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religious minority population of Timbuktu and destroy their culture and history because it 
differed from its own.  
The ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression. 
However, destruction of cultural property falls only within the remit of war crimes under the 
Statute. A question that arises from the recent spate of destruction of cultural property is, does 
the war crime of directing attacks against cultural property adequately represent the impugned 
behaviour?  
 
Prior to the enactment of the ICC Statute, the protection of cultural property was included in a 
number of international legal instruments, as well as in customary law, and had also been 
analysed before international criminal tribunals. Despite the many legal sources which seek to 
regulate attacks on cultural property, there have been divergent approaches to how cultural 
property should be dealt with under the legal framework. Some international instruments seek 
to proscribe attacks on cultural property because such property constitutes civilian property, 
while other instruments highlight the need to protect cultural property as a result of its 
importance to humanity. The former approach does not include any consideration of the value 
of property destroyed to a particular culture of minority group, but rather focuses explicitly on 
the characterisation of the property as civilian or military, and classifies such attacks as war 
crimes. However, cultural property is not attacked just because of its status as civilian property; 
rather it is generally attacked as it is symbolic of, or represents, a particular group or culture, 
as is clearly illustrated in the actions of groups such as ISIS and Ansar Dine. This article 
submits that a better characterisation of such behaviour would be a crime against humanity, as 
this would encompass the motivations of the attacks, as an act of persecution against the civilian 
population, and the impact on the victims. Section 2 of the article sets out the history of the 
legal framework on the protection of cultural property, prior to the adoption of the Rome 
Statute. Section 3 then focuses on the legal framework concerning the destruction of cultural 
property at the ICC and analyses the case of Al Mahdi, and Section 4 looks at the cultural 









2. The Protection of Cultural Property under International Law 
International law provisions seeking to protect cultural property can be traced back to 19th 
century and instruments such as the Lieber Code 1863,7 the 1874 Declaration of Brussels,8 the 
1880 Oxford Code,9 and the Hague Regulations 1899.10 In the twentieth century, Articles 27 
and 56 of the 1907 Hague Regulations of 190711 also sought to protect cultural property. In 
addition, the 1919 Commission on Responsibility identified “wanton destruction of religious, 
charitable, educational, and historic buildings and monuments” as a war crime.12 The 
justification for protecting cultural property in these instruments was its status as a non-military 
or civilian object. One of the basic tenets of international humanitarian law is the principle of 
distinction, which requires that civilian objects not be the subject of attack.13 In this approach, 
the protection of cultural property is paralleled with the protection of other civilian objects, 
including hospitals and religious sites. Its value to humanity is not recognised as a reason for 
its protection. 
 
However, other international treaties recognise that the need to protect cultural property is 
incumbent upon the international community because of its importance to humanity. This 
rationale is seen in the Hague Convention of 1954. Its Preamble states that “damage to cultural 
property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all 
mankind.”14 This Convention has been updated by means of two protocols,15 thus underscoring 
the importance of the contribution of cultural property to humanity. Additional instruments on 
cultural property adopted by UNESCO also underline the importance of cultural property to all 
                                                 
7 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field. Prepared by Francis Lieber, 
promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by President Lincoln, 24 April 1863.  
8 Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, signed at Brussels, 27 August 
1874.  
9 The Laws of War on Land, Manual published by the Institute of International Law (Oxford Manual), adopted 
by the Institute of International Law at Oxford, September 9, 1880.  
10 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899.  
11 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Articles 27 and 56. 
12 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, 14 The American 
Journal of International Law 95 (No. 1-2, 1920), p.115.   
13 International Committee of the Red Cross Customary IHL Rule 7. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005.  
14 Preamble, Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, adopted 
at The Hague, 1954.  
15First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954, 
adopted at The Hague, 14 May 1954 and Second Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property 
in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954, adopted at The Hague, 26 March 1999.     
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of humankind.16 These divergent approaches to the protection of cultural property have been 
identified by Frulli as the ‘civilian use’ approach and the ‘culture-value’ approach.17 Both 
approaches are recognised by international customary law in IHL Customary Rule 38. 18 
 
The shift to a broader understanding of cultural property was precipitated by growing attention 
being focused on cultural rights and the rights of minorities at the United Nations. Article 27 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, provides: 
‘(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, 
‘to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.19 
 
While cultural rights may be regarded as the ‘Cinderella’ of human rights,20 as they have been 
neglected in comparison to other categories of rights, work on completing the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, began in 1948, and this instrument was 
adopted in 1966, thereby spanning the same period when the 1954 Convention on Cultural 
Property was being drafted. In addition, the cultural rights of minorities were also being 
discussed and developed during the same period, culminating in Article 27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This states: 
‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own 
religion, or to use their own language.’21 
The development of universal human rights treaties, including those relating to minorities, had 
an impact on how the destruction of cultural property was dealt with before international 
tribunals in practice. A number of international criminal tribunals include provisions 
                                                 
16 See UNESCO instruments on cultural property, <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL 
_ID=13649&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=−471.html>, accessed 10 April 2017.   
17 Frulli 2011, 203.  
18 This states: ‘A. Special care must be taken in military operations to avoid damage to buildings dedicated to 
religion, art, science, education or charitable purposes and historic monuments unless they are military objectives. 
B. Property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people must not be the object of attack unless 
imperatively required by military necessity.’ Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck 2005.  
19 Proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 (General Assembly 
resolution 217 A). 
20 Claridge and Xanthaki 2016, 61.  
21 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
on 19 December 1966. 
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concerning the prosecution of attacks on cultural property,22 including Article 3(d) of the ICTY 
Statute, which includes among the violations of the laws or customs of war in respect of which 
the Tribunal has jurisdiction, ‘seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions 
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and 
works of art and science’.23 The wording of the Statute clearly indicates a civilian use approach, 
however, in practice, the Tribunal has taken a much broader approach, and has recognised the 
inextricable connection between a people and its culture. In the case of Prosecutor v. Kordić 
and Čerzek, for example, the Tribunal identified the destruction of places of worship as 
persecution as a crime against humanity because it amounted to ‘an attack on the very religious 
identity of a people’.24 In addition, in the case of Krstić, the Tribunal considered that the 
destruction of mosques constituted an attempt to erase the identity of the group and, as such, 
that it constituted ‘evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group’.25 Thus, attacks against 
cultural property have been viewed as both crimes against humanity and as evidence of 
genocide by the ICTY, not just as war crimes, as provided for in its Statute. In this regard, 
Martínez concludes that ‘the icty has consistently included the destruction of cultural and 
religious heritage within the facts constituting the widespread and systematic attack against 
civilian populations. Regarding the crime of persecution, the destruction or damage of the 
cultural heritage must be related to the intent to discriminate and, when the destroyed or 
damaged heritage is exclusively valuable for one specific population, the ICTY has consistently 
affirmed that such destruction is de facto discriminatory’.26 
 
3. The Protection of Cultural Property and the Rome Statute  
Unfortunately, the Rome Statute limits itself to ‘a civilian use rationale’ for the protection of 
cultural property. According to Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute:  
                                                 
22 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 4 (f) and the Statute of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, Art. 3 (f) mention only pillage as a war crime related to cultural property. Art. 7 of the Law on 
the Extraordinary Chambers of Cambodia provides for prosecution pursuant to the provisions of the 1954 Hague 
Convention.   
23 Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, adopted 25 May 1993 by 
Resolution 827, as amended 7 July 2009 by Resolution 1877. 
24 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerzek, 17 December 2004, icty Appeals Chamber Judgment, IT-95-14/2-A, 
<www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic_cerkez/acjug/en/cer-aj041217e.pdf>, accessed 11 April 2017, para. 207.   
25 Prosecutor v. Krstić, 2 August 2001, icty Trial Chamber Judgment, IT-98-33-T, www.icty 
.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf, accessed 11 April 2017, para. 508.   
26 See Green Martínez 2016, 1087.  
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‘[i]ntentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, 
science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick 
and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives...’ 
 in non-international armed conflicts is a war crime. The destruction of cultural property in 
international armed conflicts is also classified as a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(ix). Frulli 
comments that in the context of the ICC Statute, ‘a more specific cultural-value oriented 
approach to the criminalization of acts against cultural property committed in times of armed 
conflict would be coherent with the overall developments in the field of international criminal 
law, constantly evolving into a more sophisticated body of law.’27 
 
The question arises if the ICC could, influenced by international human rights law, including 
those rules protecting the rights of minorities, interpret the Statute’s provisions broadly to 
characterise attacks on cultural property as crimes against humanity or evidence of genocide 
as the ICTY had previously done? The first and, so far, only ICC case to deal with the 
destruction of cultural property is Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, emanating from the non-international 
armed conflict in Mali. Mali has a population of approximately 15 million people and includes 
several ethnic groups. It is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world and 
has suffered ‘decades of drought, persistent food shortages, locust infestations, civil wars and 
recurrent political instability.’28 In addition, conflicts in neighbouring States have spilled over 
into Mali. The conflict in Mali ‘is a complex and multidimensional mixture of long-term 
fundamental grievances by diverse actors and groups’29 for which there was no one single 
cause.  Zyck and Muggah state that ‘Mali and the Sahel are embedded in what might be called 
a regional conflict system’30 and that ‘simmering humanitarian, development and governance 
crises are intersecting with global, regional and local security concerns.’31 
 
While the State had been showcased as a shining example of democracy in Africa from the 
1990s onwards, in reality Mali was very unstable and fragile. In 2002, The Economist 
Intelligence Unit called Mali “a bulwark against radical Islam in Africa”32 and the State was 
seen as being committed to laïcité in the aftermath of 9/11. However, this changed as Islamic 
                                                 
27 Frulli 2011, 216.  
28 Francis 2013, 4.  
29 Ibid, 2.  
30 Zyck and Muggah 2013, 1. 
31 Ibid, 1. 
32 Economic Intelligence Unit 2002, 47.  
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fundamentalism began to rise in the region. There have been ongoing tensions between the 
minority Taureg population (making up approximately 10% of the Malian population)33 and 
the central government since 1962, as the Tuaregs have attempted to gain independence from 
the Northern region, with the aim of creating an independent state of Azawad.34 A concerted 
rebellion began in 2012, fuelled by weapons and soldiers from the Libyan conflict, led by the 
Mouvement national de liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA). However, the violence also streamed 
from other causes, and can be divided into three separate streams. 35  First, the war of 
independence fought by Tuareg ethnic groups in the north of the State. Second, the conflict 
precipitated by the military coup and the overthrow of the democratically elected government, 
replacing President Amadou Touré with Captain Amadou Sanogo. Third, the conflict caused 
by Islamic extremists to take control of the state and impose Sharia law. These streams overlap 
and intertwine but the motivations behind the violence in each stream are different. It is the 
third stream, from which the attacks on the city of Timbuktu emanated. 
 
Mali ratified the Rome Statute on 16 August 2000 and its government referred the ‘situation in 
Mali since January 2012’ to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC in July 2012.36 
During its preliminary examination of the Situation in Mali the OTP reported that as of around 
17 January 2012, a non-international armed conflict was ongoing in the territory of Mali 
between the government forces and a number of organised armed groups, including the 
Mouvement national delibération de l’Azawad (National Movement for the Liberation of 
Azawad, MNLA), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine and the Mouvement 
pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West 
Africa, MUJAO) and ‘Arab militias’. Other Islamist groups, such as Boko Haram, were also 
active in the region according to some reports.37 In addition, the OTP stated these groups were 
also involved in a conflict between each other, with no involvement from the governmental 
armed forces,38 illustrating the ethnic tensions underlying the conflict. The OTP then opened 
an investigation into alleged crimes committed on the territory of Mali since 2012 on 16 
January 2013. 
                                                 
33 Keita 1998, 5. 
34 Ibid, 5.   
35 ICC Office of the Prosecutor 2013, para. 4. 
36 See letter of referral from the Malian Minister for Justice to the Prosecutor, 13 July 2013. Available at: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A245A47F-BFD1-45B6-891C-
3BCB5B173F57/0/ReferralLetterMali130712.pdf. 
37 ICC Office of the Prosecutor 2013, para. 29.  




The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Mr Al Mahdi on 18 September 201539 in respect of the 
intentional directing of attacks against historic monuments and/or buildings dedicated to 
religion, including nine mausoleums and one mosque in Timbuktu, between about 30 June 
2012 and 10 July 2012, and he was subsequently surrendered to the ICC by the Republic of 
Niger on 26 September 2015. He made his initial appearance before the Court on 30 September 
201540 and the Document containing Charges was filed by the Prosecutor on 17 December 
2015.41 This contained a single charge alleging that Mr Al Mahdi was responsible for the war 
crime of attacking protected objects under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute.42 On 18 February 
2016, the parties reached a plea agreement regarding the charge.43 The Confirmation of 
Charges hearing took place in March 2016, with the charges being confirmed on March 24.44 
During this hearing Mr Al Mahdi informed the Court of his intention to plead guilty to the 
charges. The trial took place between 22 and 24 August 2016,45 during which Mr Al Mahdi 
made an admission of guilt. The judgment was issued on 27 September, with Mr Al Mahdi 
being sentenced to 9 years in prison.46 
 
As stated above, Mr Al Mahdi was the leader of the morality police put in place in Timbuktu 
in Mali by the Islamic fundamentalist group Ansar Dine. The Hisbah was responsible for the 
destruction of numerous buildings and sites of cultural value, many of which were listed on the 
UNESCO World Heritage List.47 As head of the Hisbah, Mr Al Mahdi had control over the 
destruction of cultural property. The Pre-Trial Chamber found that the mission of the Hisbah 
was ‘to prevent apparent vice and to promote virtue as well as to carry out charitable tasks’.48 
This organisation was tasked with ‘the prevention of anything that can be considered as 
                                                 
39 Arrest Warrant, Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-1-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 18 September 2015. 
40 ICC-01/12/01/15-T-1-ENG. 
41 ICC-01/12-01/15-62, ICC-01/12-01/15-63 and –AnxA (Arabic translation); ICC-01/12-01/15-70 and –AnxA-
Corr (English translation). 
42 Chef d’accusation retenu par l’Accusation contre Ahmad AL FAQI AL MAHDI, 17 December 2015, ICC-
01/12-01/15-62. 
43 Annex 1 to the Version publique expurgée du «Dépôt de l’Accord sur l’aveu de culpabilité de M. Ahmad Al 
Faqi Al Mahdi», 25 février 2016, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Conf-Exp, 25 February 2016, ICC-01/12-01/15-78- Anx1-
tENG-Red (confidential English translation notified on 21 June 2016, public redacted version notified on 19 
August 2016 and public redacted English translation notified on 9 September 2016). 
44 Decision on the confirmation of charges against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, 24 March 2016.  
45 ICC-01/12-01/15-T-4-Red-ENG, ICC-01/12-01/15-T-5-Red-ENG, ICC-01/12-01/15-T-6-ENG.   
46 The Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, Verdict and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, 27 September 2016. 
47 UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention Nomination Documentation. See: 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/nominations/.   
48 Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 24 March 2016, icc, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation 
of charges against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, www .icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02424.PDF, accessed 10 April 2017, para. 46.   
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worshipping the tombs, such as building the dome over the tomb’.49 The incidents of which Mr 
Al Mahdi was found guilty took place in the city of Timbuktu between 30 June 2012 and 11 
July 2012. The city had been under the control of a number of fundamentalist Islamic groups, 
including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine, between early April 2012 
and January 2013.50 Mr Al Mahdi was involved in various aspects of the Ansar Dine and AQIM 
administration and was in direct contact with the leaders of Ansar Dine and AQIM, including 
Iyad Ag Ghaly (Ansar Dine leader), Abou Zeid (who governed Timbuktu under the armed 
groups), Yahia Abou Al Hammam (an AQIM chief) and Abdullah Al Chinguetti (a religious 
scholar and member of AQIM). In June 2012 Ag Ghaly, after consultation with other Islamic 
leaders in the region, decided to destroy the mausoleums.51 While Mr Al Mahdi put forward 
the proposition that all Islamic jurists agree on the prohibition of any construction over a tomb, 
he nevertheless recommended against destroying the mausoleums in order to maintain a good 
relationship between the occupying groups and the local population.52 In spite of this advice 
Ag Ghaly gave orders to proceed with the destruction of mausoleums to Abou Zeid, and he in 
turn informed Mr Al Mahdi,53  who wrote a sermon on the destruction of the mausoleums 
which was read out at Friday prayer.54 Mr Al Mahdi declared publicly that the decision to attack 
the sites was purposefully taken, stating ‘nous agissons ainsi parce que nous voulons le 
demolition des dȏmes.’55 He also proclaimed that the destruction of the domes had been 
ordered by ‘le Messager’ and that the destruction was not prohibited by the religious sources 
which he had consulted.56 Mr Al Mahdi decided the order in which the sites were to be 
attacked57 and personally participated in the attacks and / or oversaw them.58 Video-tapes of 
Mr Al Mahdi participating in the attacks had been introduced into evidence by the Prosecution. 
In all, 10 of the most important cultural sites in Timbuktu were attacked and destroyed by Mr 
Al Mahdi and others as part of the same common plan. These were: the Sidi Mahamoud Ben 
                                                 
49 Ibid., para. 47.   
50 Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 3-5; Video of Ouman Ould Hamaha speaking about 
Ansar Dine’s control of Timbuktu, MLI-OTP-0018-0352, from 00:00:00 to 00:00:41, MLI-OTP-0033-5448 (full 
French transcript); Video of Ansar Dine at Timbuktu airport, MLI-OTP-0018-0345; Video of Ansar Dine’s flag 
at Timbuktu airport, MLI-OTP-0018-0195; Video of interview with Ansar Dine’s member from the airport of 
Timbuktu, MLI-OTP-0018-0197 (Transcript, MLI-OTP-0033-5436); Statement by P-65, MLI-OTP-0020-0019-
R01, 0059-0063; Statement by P-66, MLI-OTP-0019-0296-R01, 0299, 0304-06.   
51 Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, para. 38.   
52 Ibid. para. 37. 
53 Ibid, paras. 24, 38-40.   
54 Ibid. Para. 44. 




58 Ibid, para 51.   
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Omar Mohamed Aquit Mausoleum, the Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani 
Mausoleum,59 the Sheik Sidi El Mokhtar Ben Sidi Mouhammad Al Kabir Al Kounti 
Mausoleum,60 the Alpha Moya Mausoleum,61 the Sheik Mouhamad El Mikki Mausoleum,62 
the Sheik Abdoul Kassim Attouaty Mausoleum,63 the Sheik Sidi Ahmed Ben Amar Arragadi 
Mausoleum,64 the door of the Sidi Yahia Mosque,65 the Bahaber Babadié Mausoleum and the 
Ahmed Fulane Mausoleum, both adjoining the Djingareyber Mosque.66 
 
These sites were either fully or partially destroyed and all but one site was classified as world 
heritage and protected by the UNESCO 1972 Convention on the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage.67 During the case, comments made by Mr Al Mahdi during the 
attack on the Djingareyber Mosque, were reiterated. He stated: “It’s probably the oldest mosque 
here in town, and is considered a heritage site [...] a World Heritage Site. There are so many 
rumours relating to these shrines [...]. Those UNESCO jackasses – this [...] they think that this 
is heritage. Does ‘heritage’ include worshipping cows and trees?”68 This illustrates some of Mr 
Al Mahdi’s motivations for the attacks and his disrespect for other cultures. His actions were 
not motivated by a wish to destroy civilian property, but rather focused much more on a desire 
to destroy rid Timbuktu of cultural diversity, i.e. a lack of respect for the culture of ‘others’ 
and a wish to destroy religious representations which were not in line with his own beliefs. 
Despite the narrow focus of the text of the Rome Statute on destruction of cultural property as 
a war crime only, both the Prosecutor and the Chamber focused on the importance of cultural 
property and its benefits for mankind throughout the case. Indeed, it could be said that both 
took a ‘culture-value approach’ as to why attacks on cultural property should be criminalised. 
At the Confirmation of Charges hearing, the Prosecutor stated that: ‘[t]he destruction of such 
monuments constitutes the annihilation of structures that had survived the ravages of time and 
which stood as testimony to Timbuktu’s glorious past and important place in history and to its 
people over generations’.69 In a similar vein, the Chamber stated that destruction of the 
                                                 
59 Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 64-65.   
60 Ibid, 66-72. 
61 Ibid, 73-78.  
62 Ibid, 85-86.   
63 Ibid, 87-88. 
64 Ibid, paras. 82-84. 
65 Ibid, paras. 89-95.   
66 Ibid, paras. 96-103. 
67 Ibid, para. 33.   
68 The Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, Verdict and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, 27 September 2016, para. 46. This 
quote came from Video, MLI-OTP-0018-0148 (Translated Transcript, MLI-OTP-0025-0337, 0340). 
69 Office of the ICC Prosecutor 2016 (a). 
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UNESCO heritage sites ‘does not only affect the direct victims of the crimes, namely the 
faithful and inhabitants of Timbuktu, but also people throughout Mali and the international 
community.’70 The Chamber thus concluded that the targeted sites were not simply religious 
buildings ‘but had also a symbolic and emotional value for the inhabitants of Timbuktu’ and 
that this was ‘relevant in assessing the gravity of the crime committed.’71 The importance of 
cultural property to humanity is, therefore, an important theme throughout the case of Al Mahdi. 
However, neither the Prosecutor nor the Chamber attempted to characterise the attacks on 
cultural property in Mali as crimes against humanity or as evidence of genocide. The case is 
therefore rather curious, with the charge not exactly fitting the crime. Mr Al Mahdi’s guilty 
plea truncated the Trial proceedings however, and if the Court had more time to delve into Mr 
Al Mahdi’s motivations for the destruction of the mausoleums, perhaps it may have seized the 
opportunity to address this curiosity, and such an approach is certainly possible, as highlighted 
by Martínez, who states that ‘[e]ven though the definition of the crime against humanity of 
persecution does not make explicit reference to cultural property, it can be applied to sanction 
the destruction of cultural property, it can be applied to sanction the destruction of cultural 
property…’72 
 
4. The Aftermath 
As mentioned above, Timbuktu was overrun in 2012 by rebel groups, including Ansar Dine, 
carrying Libyan weapons, which imposed Sharia law, banned music and whipped people who 
did not adhere to their code. The destruction of the mausoleums was an attempt to destroy the 
cultural pluralism of the city and a mark of disrespect to the Sufi religious group. The tombs 
which were destroyed were those of Sufi saints, who are thought to protect the city against evil 
spirits. The impact of the destruction on the local inhabitants was extreme. This was summed 
up in evidence given by the Malian expert on cultural matters who had testified that ‘destroying 
the mausoleums ... aimed at breaking the soul of the people of Timbuktu’.73 However, the local 
community in Timbuktu has been resilient, and the destroyed sites have undergone 
reconstruction, with the help of UNESCO and a number of donors, including the EU. This 
began in 2015 with the inauguration of the destroyed mausoleums, which have since been 
                                                 
70 Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 27 September 2016, ICC Trial Chamber VIII, Judgment and Sentence, 
ICC-01/12-01/15, para. 80.   
71 Ibid, para. 79. 
72 Green Martínez 2016, 1080.  
73 Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 27 September 2016, ICC Trial Chamber VIII, Judgment and Sentence, 
ICC-01/12-01/15, para. 79. 
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consecrated. The consecration ceremony, held at the Mosque of Djingareyber in 2016, was 
intended to invoke the divine mercy ‘to provide the basis for peace, cohesion and tranquillity’,74 
and ‘also represent the rejection of intolerance, violent extremism and religious 
fundamentalism’75, which had destroyed the city’s cultural heritage. 
Speaking at an event to mark the reinstallation of the Sacred Gate of Sidi Yahia, the Director-
General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova, stressed the importance of heritage protection for the spirit 
of the local community, stating: ‘The reinstallation of the sacred gate, a religious and cultural 
landmark of Timbuktu, marks a new and decisive step in Mali’s reconstruction and peace 
building work. This—along with the reconstruction of the mausoleums of Timbuktu and the 
trial of those responsible for their destruction at the International Criminal Court—sends strong 
message to all extremists.’76  Bokova has also highlighted the importance of the restoration 
work to ‘ensure that the people of Mali can reclaim heritage that is essential to their identity 
and that can contribute to reconciliation.  This is vital for Mali and this is important for the rest 
of the world because World Heritage is common to all of us.’77 
On 17th August 2017, Trial Chamber VIII of the ICC issued a Reparations Order in the case of 
Al Mahdi, concluding that Mr Al Mahdi is liable for €2.7 million in expenses for individual 
and collective reparations for the community of Timbuktu for intentionally directing attacks 
against religious and historic buildings in that city.78 Because Mr Al Mahdi is indigent, the 
Chamber encouraged the Trust Funds for Victims to complement the reparations award and 
directed it to submit a draft implementation plan for 16 February 2018. 
The Chamber considered the observations of the ICC Prosecutor, the Defence, the Legal 
representatives of Victims representing the 139 reparations applicants, the Trust Fund for 
Victims, and the ICC Registry, as well as four appointed experts and amici curiae, including 
UNESCO, when deciding on reparations. Throughout this decision, the Chamber placed 
emphasis on the value of cultural property to the people of Mali and the harm caused to them 
as a result of its destruction. The Chamber recalled a witness statement, which stated that the 
destruction ‘carries a message of terror and helplessness; destroys part of humanity's shared 
memory and collective consciousness, and renders humanity unable to transmit its values and 
knowledge to future generations.’79 
                                                 
74 UNESCO 2016 (a). 
75 Ibid. 
76 UNESCO 2016 (b). 
77 UNESCO 2014.. 
78 Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Reparations Order, 17 August 2017. 
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The Chamber ordered reparations for three categories of harm: damage to the attacked historic 
and religious buildings, consequential economic loss, and moral harm. In addition to the €2.7 
million in expenses for individuals and collective reparations, the Chamber ordered one 
symbolic euro to be received by the Malian State and UNESCO, given its role in the protection 
of cultural property. The Chamber also ordered that collective reparations be made in the form 
of memorials and commemoration ceremonies, and that, as a symbolic gesture, the video of 
Mr Al Mahdi’s apology to victims be posted on the ICC website. It is clear that the reparations 
order focused intently on the damage and harm done to the population of Mali and to humanity 
in general as a result of the destruction of the cultural property in Mali, appreciating the broader, 
culture value, approach to the protection of such property, which does not fit with the 
formulation of the crimes in the Rome Statute. 
 
Conclusion 
The Rome Statute has taken a very conservative, ‘civilian-use’ view of attacks on cultural 
property by classifying attacks against such property as war crimes, and failing to see the 
potential characterisation of such attacks as crimes against humanity or evidence of genocide. 
In taking this approach, there has been a failure to appreciate the inextricable link between 
cultural property and the people it represents. There has also been a failure to appreciate the 
motivations of groups such as Ansar Dine and ISIS in destroying cultural property. As stated 
by Bokova, ‘[c]ultural cleansing is a tactic of war, used to destabilize populations and weaken 
social defences. The destruction of heritage undermines wellsprings of identity and belonging, 
paving the way to social disintegration. Eliminating the layers of history, cities, and homes 
affects people’s perceptions of the past and present and shadows their confidence in a future 
where their rights and dignity would be respected.’80 Given the strengthening of cultural rights 
and the rights of minorities since the first international legal instruments seeking to protect 
cultural property were adopted, it is surprising that the Rome Statute took such a narrow 
approach. This narrow approach is even more surprising, given the creativity of the ICTY in 
this area. The ICC Statute is, therefore, a step back with regard to the protection of cultural 
property. However, it is still open to the ICC to broaden out the understanding of attacks on 
cultural property and characterise them as crimes against humanity and genocide in its practice. 
While the case of Al Mahdi was disappointing from this perspective, it is hoped that the Court 
will grasp the opportunity if presented again. 
                                                 




From a practical perspective, the acceptance of the destruction of cultural property as a crime 
against humanity would allow for the prosecution of such destruction during peace time. This 
is very significant, as attacks on cultural property belonging to minority or other groups is often 
the first sign that conflict will begin. In this vein. Petrovic comments that ‘…cultural property 
is indivisible from people’s identity and dignity, and for [that] reason…such property’s wilful 
destruction is usually a precursor to human tragedy.’81 From an ideological perspective, it is 
important that the full and true story behind attacks on cultural property is told, from 
motivations to impacts on victims. When analysing the motivations of Mr Al Mahdi and the 
impacts on the population of Timbuktu, Mali, and indeed, the whole of humanity, it is clear to 
see that a crime against humanity is a better fit than a war crime, as this recognises that cultural 
property is destroyed to persecute or destroy a group’s identity, and also recognises the 
contributions of cultural property to the whole of humanity. 
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